The MINEX II trial was conducted to evaluate the accuracy and speed of MATCH-ON-CARD verification algorithms. These run on ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards. They compare conformant reference and verification instances of the ISO/IEC 19794-2 COMPACT CARD fingerprint minutia standard. The test therefore represents an assessment of the core viability of the de facto leading compact biometric data element on personal identity credentials based on the the industry standard smart card. The results are relevant to users seeking to use minutia templates as an additional factor for authentication.
1. The absolute error rates quoted herein were measured by using the provided implementations on a fixed corpus of operational fingerprint images. However, error rates observed in real-world applications are strongly dependent on a number of factors legitimately not reflected in the experimental design of MINEX II . Among these are:
Environment -For instance, low humidity is associated with higher false rejection;
Number of verification attempts -More attempts lead to lower false rejection, and higher false acceptance;
Number of images used, and the fusion policy -If several images from a sequence are matched, accuracy can be improved;
Number of fingers used, and the fusion policy -If images from two or more fingers are used, accuracy is improved;
Demographics -Younger adult populations are widely considered to be easier to match;
Habituation -Users who regularly interact with a system experience lower rejection rates;
The sensor, and the enrollment policy -The application of quantitative quality criteria, e.g. in an auto-capture loop, improves error rates;
The data format in use -Proprietary templates generally offer superior error rates to standardized formats [7] , but are non-interoperable. Proprietary extensions to standard templates are similarly non-interoperable unless executable code for each vendor's extensions is built into the reader or read from the card.
2. With respect to MOC specifically, the accuracy and speed of operational verification transactions will generally depend on a number of factors, including the following.
The operational card stock in use.
The number of templates stored on the card.
The number of fingers presented.
The quality of the enrollment procedure particularly whether a verification was done at time of card issuance.
The communications channel and interface.
The cryptographic operations needed to secure the channel and to authenticate the card and data elements (but see SBMOC in 1.4).
In addition, the template generation and matching algorithms are strongly influential on error rates. To the extent that MINEX II measured the accuracy of leading industrial and academic algorithms (i.e. only partially), these aspects are documented here. Thus this MINEX trial addresses the core algorithmic capability of a MOC implementation. The results:
support qualification processes (e.g. PIV ), have relevance operationally (matching accuracy and speed are strongly influential components of a system),
are not sufficient for prediction of fielded performance.
Disclaimer
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Terms and Definitions 
Introduction
The approval of the U.S. and international fingerprint minutia template standards, specifically INCITS 378 and ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 , have created the possibility to establish an interoperable multivendor marketplace for applications involving fast, economic, and accurate interchange and matching of compact biometric templates.
The standards are not application specific. They define formats which can be used for both MATCH-OFF-CARD and MATCH-ON-CARD . While the viability of the templates for MATCH-OFF-CARD has been assessed previously [7, 6, 5] , the MATCH-ON-CARD application, which is almost always conceived of as occuring on conformant ISO/IEC 7816 smart cards, has not been independently and publicly tested.
Thus, the MINEX II trial was designed to answer three important and outstanding questions surrounding MATCH-ON-CARD , namely:
What is the accuracy loss incurred using the three bytes per minutia ISO/IEC 19794-2 COMPACT CARD format favored for MATCH-ON-CARD , vs. the six bytes per minutia INCITS 378 format?
What loess in accuracy is incurred when fingerprint minutia templates are matched on ISO/IEC 7816 cards vs. on a resource-rich processor?
What is the time needed to execute the algorithmic matching operation?
The first question was addressed in the MINEX II Evaluation Plan [8] . While the last question can be estimated by ad hoc usage, it is the near-term imperative to answer the second question that served as the primary motivator for the MINEX II study. 2 . This mandated the establishment of a common identification standard for federal employees and contractors. It required interoperable use of identity credentials to control physical and logical access to federal government facilities and systems. In response, NIST released FIPS 201 3 in February 2005, which includes the definition of an identity credential. It specified the inclusion of data from two fingerprints as a third authentication factor. The format for this information was finalized in February 2006, when NIST Special Publication 800-76 specified the MINEX II profile of the INCITS 378 standard. A broad timeline is given in Table 2 .
MINEX background
The wider MINEX program is intended to improve template-based interoperability from the imperfect state reported in MINEX 04 and MTIT [6] toward that achievable with image-based implementations. The approach is to conduct several programs, MINEX II, III, IV etc, each of which will embed development, evaluation, targeted feedback and consultation activities between NIST, industry and other interested parties. Within scope are any issues to do with fingerprint minutiae as an interoperable biometric. Typical outcomes will be measurements of accuracy, processing time, template size, and commentary on the relevant standards, studies of utility of quality measures, calibration information, and new metrics. Two prior tests have been conducted: MINEX 04 was conducted as an initial comparison of image vs. minutia-based interoperability. It assessed the core algorithmic ability of fingerprint matcher Z to compare minutiae templates from sources X and Y. It compared the matching accuracy in that case with fully proprietary templates on the same sets of archival images. The test adopted the INCITS The following are specifically not within the current scope of this evaluation.
The ISO/IEC 19794-2 "record" and "card normal" templates.
Ridge count, core and delta, and zonal quality extensions. 4 For results and participation see http://fingerprint.nist.gov/minex. 6 See http://biometrics.nist.gov/nigos TecSec  Precise Biometrics  00990100  000B0100  MX2A  +  TecSec  Precise Biometrics  00990101  000B0101  MX2B  +  Internet Risk Management  Neurotechnologija  00312001  00312001  MX2C  +  Sagem Morpho  Sagem Morpho  001D6221  001D0002  MX2D  +  +  +  +  Sagem Morpho  Sagem Morpho  001D6221  001D0003  MX2E  +  +  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010B  003F0301  MX2F  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010C  003F0108  MX2G  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010C  003F0109  MX2H  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010C  003F0216  MX2I  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010C  003F0222  MX2J  +  +  Oberthur  ID 3  0415010C  003F0228  MX2K  + Proprietary templates, and non-standard extensions to any standardized minutia format.
Evaluation of readers, including performance, conformance and interoperability.
Evaluation of ruggedness or durability of the card.
On-card template generation (i.e. extraction of minutiae from images).
Template update or adaptation.
A formal test of conformance to parts of ISO/IEC 7816. However, the test uses ISO/IEC 7816 parts 4 and 11, and conformance to the relevant clauses thereof was required.
Devices not conforming to ISO/IEC 7816, including all system-on-card and sense-on-card devices embedding proprietary templates 7 .
Participation
With the primary MINEX II objective to ascertain MATCH-ON-CARD capability by measuring fingerprint algorithm accuracy in the intended environment (i.e. the card), the test allowed card vendors to team with several fingerprint algorithm vendors, and vice versa. This policy reflected the notion that if accuracy can be traded against speed, then a fingerprint supplier's technology may demonstrate improved accuracy when implemented on a more capable card. NIST therefore required identification of both the card and fingerprint technology suppliers, and these are presented in Table 3 . Note
The teams participating in MINEX II are identified by their full name in Table 3 , and by a letter code and an abbreviated name in the running footer of each page.
The test was conducted in two phases. The first was intended as a preliminary small scale test with release of results only to the provider. Per the participation agreement [8] , Table 3 indicates the names of the teams in both phases. One team elected to participate only in Phase II. Two others withdrew after Phase I.
Participants were encouraged, but not required, to supply an INCITS 378 fingerprint minutia template generator. One elected to do so. 7 These devices should only be tested in a live scenario test, with device instrumentation to capture proprietary templates for offline crosscomparison. 
Relationship to NIST's SBMOC activity
A concurrent and related but procedurally separate activity, SECURE BIOMETRIC MATCH-ON-CARD (SBMOC) FEASIBIL-ITY STUDY was conducted at NIST 9 asa a demonstration of MATCH-ON-CARD authentication in which the communications channel was secured, the privacy and integrity of the biometric data was cryptographically protected and the card was authenticated to the reader, and this was done using a contactless interface. The operations were timed, with the goal of conducting an authentication within 2.5 seconds. The results have been published as NISTIR 7452 Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report [4] .
Not all participants in the SBMOC entered MINEX II , and vice versa.
Test implementation

Concept
The MINEX II evaluation measures MATCH-ON-CARD performance at low false match rates with statistical robustness. This necessitates the execution of very large numbers of genuine and impostor comparisons. These cannot be conducted on physical cards for reasons of total time and card durability. Thus, the fundamental approach to testing is to run a PC-based implementation of the card algorithm, and then to verify that the PC algorithm is the same as that on the card by re-running a subset of the template comparisons on the actual card, and checking that the output similarity scores are identical. 8 See http://fingerprint.nist.gov/minex 9 MINEX II was run by the Information Access Division. The SBMOC activity was conducted by the Computer Security Division.
Procedures
The test was implemented by requiring participants to submit the minutiae matching algorithm as an SDK conforming to the MINEX II API specification and a card supporting the MINEX II APDUs. Both of these are documented definitively in the accompanying MINEX II Evaluation Plan [8] .
NIST 
Fingerprint datasets
A single corpus of fingerprint images was used for MINEX II testing. This is referred to as the POEBVA data set, and it is identical to that described in the MINEX 04 report [7] except that more samples have been drawn from the same population. The dataset is distinguished from many biometric testing corpora in two valuable ways:
First, the enrollment and authentication images are collected at separate locations in different environments with different sensors. The BVA images are collected as part of a non-immigrant visa application process. The POE images are collected later when the subject crosses the U.S. border at a Port of Entry.
Second, the POE authentication images were collected without human intervention in an autocapture process. This embeds an automated quality-in-the-loop assessment to select the best image, ahead of a timeout. This has the effect of elevating overall quality.
Together these aspects enhance the operational relevance of the MINEX II results.
Interoperabilty
The MINEX II study addressed the conventional logical or physical access paradigm in which a user's smart card, populated with a reference template provided by vendor A and a matching algorithm from vendor B, is used in an authentication attempt in which a template is generated from an acquired image by the generator from a third vendor, C. This tripartite scenario was examined in MINEX 04 and error rates were generally degraded relative to the case where the verification template generator and matcher were provided by the same supplier, as they may well be in off-card matching. Table 5 summarizes typical bipartite and tripartite relationships in federated interoperable applications. 10 This test is repeated for each combination of template generators. Often A = B, B = C Table 5 : Typical relationships and roles in interoperable applications.
Metrics
Performance measures
This document quantifies accuracy and interoperability in terms of false non-match and false match error rates, FNMR and FMR . The quantities are computed empirically. If s ii denotes a matcher score obtained by comparing two samples from person i, and N (t) is the number of such scores below threshold, t,
then FNMR is the fraction of genuine comparisons for which the score is less than the operating threshold:
where N (−∞) is the number of genuine comparisons conducted. Likewise, if s ij denotes a matcher score obtained by comparing samples from persons i and j, and M (t) is the number of such scores greater than or equal to a threshold, t,
then FMR is the fraction of impostor comparisons resulting in a score greater than or equal to the operating threshold
where M (∞) is number of impostor comparisons conducted.
FMR is regarded as a measure of security, i.e. the fraction of illegitmate matching attempts that result in success. These error rates must be understood as being matching error rates, not transactional rates. The ISO/IEC SC 37 Working Group 5 has established different terms for these rates: FMR and FNMR refer to comparisons of single samples, while FAR and FRR apply to the outcome of a human-system transaction in which a user might, for example, make multiple attempts and multiple finger placements.
Thresholds in the DET computation
As is typical in offline testing [2] , this report does not fix an operating threshold but instead uses all the scores from a matcher as thresholds that could be used in actual operation.
Number of unique score values Genuine  Impostor  All  MX2D  18907  7428  19993  MX2E  19544  7503  19996  MX2G  101  24  101  MX2H  110  22  110  MX2I  103  21  103  MX2J  103  21  103  MX2K  103  21  103  MX2M  50  14  50   Table 6 : Number of unique similarity scores.
This testing practice contrasts with fielded MATCH-ON-CARD applications in which the card is configured with a fixed operating threshold, against which a decision is rendered.
For MINEX II we required the SDK and the card to produce integer matcher scores on at most [0, 65535]. The advantage over just producing true-false decisions is that it allows a survey over all operating points, t, and the production of a DET characteristic. This is a plot of FNMR(t) against FMR(t) 11 and, as the primary output of a biometric performance test, is vital in establishing the tradeoff between the inconvenience incorrect rejection of legitimate users, and the incorrect acceptance of fraudulent users.
Thresholds for computation of interoperability matrices
Setting an operational threshold is often a sensitive issue because of implications for security, convenience, throughput, and cost. It is always application specific. Although this report makes no recommendations on threshold setting, it has necessarily adopted "default" performance figures of merit in support of comparison objectives. Unless stated otherwise, the results in this report correspond to the threshold that produces a FMR of 0.01. The figure of merit is the FNMR at that point. The value 0.01 should not be construed as a recommended operating point but as a value at which error rate differences may be readily observed.
The interoperability matrices show FNMR for fixed FMR values, e.g. f = 0.01. However, this requires the computation of FNMR(t 0 ) for t 0 = FMR −1 (f ), and while this is trivial for continuous matcher scores it is not so for tied integer scores. The inverse FMR computation is approximate because there is no value for which FMR(t 0 ) is exactly f . So the threshold actually used, t, is the lowest observed score value for which FMR(t) ≤ f . In some cases this yields FMR values substantially below the target f . This is a conservative policy decision in the sense that FMR is on the "safe" side of f . This issue is especially apparent in MATCH-ON-CARD implementations because, as Table 6 shows, some algorithms emit only a limited number of unique scores, perhaps as a result of some need to to conserve computational resources. The values are observations over O(10 7 ) comparisons. In principle, each value can be used as a threshold against which acceptance and rejection decisions are based. The lack of possible impostor values precludes a fine grained setting of security policy. The MINEX 04 matchers exhibited many more unique values. The fused scores used in Table 8 take on more unique values because of the eq.(6) sum.
This issue is not critical for DETs, which plot the error rates at all possible thresholds with straight lines connecting them. Note, that theory indicates [12] that points on the convex hull of the DET curve between two operating thresholds are accessible by randomly using one or the other for each comparison. The operational use of this practice is not known.
Handling failure to enroll
The MINEX test protocols have all required template generators to produce a standard template whatever the input image. Thus if a template generator was presented with an image of such poor quality that it would operationally reject 11 DET characteristics sometimes plot Normal deviates, i.e. a plot in which the FNMR and FMR are (nonlinearly) transformed by the inverse CDF of N (0, 1). This is abandoned here because the score densities are not Normal.
it (i.e. a failure to enroll), the output in MINEX II is nevertheless required to be a template that is a valid input to the matcher. The template is allowed to contain zero minutiae. Such templates are formally conformant to INCITS 378 .
When a SDK-based or MOC-based algorithm is presented with a zero minutiae template it will produce a low similarity score (e.g. zero). 
Support for biometric data interchange standards
The BIOMDI open source project 12 contains several software library and program packages for handling records specified in INCITS and ISO biometric data format standards. The MINEX II test program uses the finger minutia package to process the INCITS 378 records, converting them to ISO compact card format. In addition, several tools in this package are used to validate the records, or simply to view them.
Support for MATCH-ON-CARD implementations
The BIOMAPP open source project 13 contains the source code for the match on card test drivers, the tag-length-value (TLV) object processing, and an example SDK test driver. The programs within the BIOMAPP project make use of the finger minutiae libraries from the BIOMDI project. Also, the card test driver utilizes the pcsclite library described in Appendix A.
The goal of the BIOMAPP match on card package is to achieve independence from any particular vendor's middleware. The software communicates directly with the card at the APDU level, removing any need for a middleware API or custom smart card software.
MOC Accuracy
Uncertainty estimates
This section includes estimates of various false non-match rate (FNMR ) and false match rates (FMR ). These were estimated over fixed numbers of template comparisons.
For single finger matching, the number of genuine and impostor comparisons was 247924 and 2499880 respectively corresponding to the use of two impressions of each of the left and right index fingers of 123962 unique subjects. The left index finger from each subject was compared with upto ten other left index fingers. The right index finger was compared with the right index finger of the same individuals. Each finger of each subject was used in only one genuine comparison.
For two-finger matching, the number of genuine and impostor comparisons was 123962 and 1249940. Again subjects were reused upto ten times. 12 See http://biometrics.nist.gov/nigos 13 Ibid. The error rates follow binomial statistics, such that if experiments of the same size were repeated using samples drawn from the same population then, with 95% coverage, the error rate measurement would fall between p − u ≤ p ≤ p + u where p is the true error rate,
and α = 0.05. This Normal approximation to the binomial distribution leads to the following estimates of uncertainty. These estimates apply to the population of fingerprints identified in 2.3 and do not represent systematic effects associated with the caveats identified on page 2.
Match-on-Card vs. Match-off-Card
Only one vendor has elected to submit matching algorithms to NIST's on-card MINEX II and off-card MINEX 04 trials. Table 7 shows accuracy for the two implementations: While many of the differences are small and not, in isolation, statistically significant the MATCH-OFF-CARD error rates are all lower than the MATCH-ON-CARD rates. The last row of the Table shows the ratio of the total false non-matches if all the generators were used in equal proportion. The result is that the MATCH-ON-CARD algorithm produces about 20% to 40% more false non-matches than the provider's MATCH-OFF-CARD implementation 14 . This effect appears to be larger at lower FMR values. This intra-vendor difference in accuracy is substantially less than the inter-vendor differences reported in Table 8 . These observations apply to standard templates only.
NIST has not measured accuracy of the MATCH-OFF-CARD implementation since the MINEX 04 implementation was submitted in 2004. Figure 1 shows the Detection Error Tradeoff characteristics for the MATCH-ON-CARD implementations tested. The top and bottom plots show, respectively, the result for single finger, and sum-fused two-finger, verification. We make the following observations.
Comparison of MOC implementations
There is a large variation in accuracy between MATCH-ON-CARD matchers. In the operationally interesting range 0.0001 ≤ FMR ≤ 0.01 the rows of Table 8 show that the most accurate implementations demonstrate FNMR values a factor of ten or more smaller than the least accurate.
In the operationally interesting range 0.0001 ≤ FMR ≤ 0.01 the curves do not cross. Thus, if one matcher is more accurate at one threshold, it will also be more accurate elsewhere. This means that comparative evaluation of MATCH-ON-CARD implementations at one threshold is substanially representative of another. This result is not generally true however.
False non-match rates FMR = 0.0001 are between two and four times worse than those at FMR = 0.01.
The two-finger false non-match rates are almost an order of magnitude lower than the single-finger rates.
Accuracy is generally improved when both templates are produced by generator B. The exceptions are for MX2D and MX2E which exhibit better performance when used with the MX2D generator. These two effects are evident in the data reported in the MINEX 04 trial: Matchers give greater accuracy on templates from the same source and to a lesser extent when one of the templates is produced by the matcher provider's template generator.
Would accuracy be sufficient for PIV compliance?
The question of whether a MATCH-ON-CARD matcher would qualify for the U.S. Government's Personal Identity Verification program is addressed here by subjecting the MATCH-ON-CARD implementation to the NIST Special Publication 800-76-1 interoperable accuracy specification. This states that a matcher submitted for PIV shall be capable of verifying INCITS 378 templates from all previously qualified template generators. This measurement activity is conducted by NIST under the ONGOING MINEX name. The process requires the supplier of the matcher to also submit a template generator. This requirement derives from the MATCH-OFF-CARD situation in which the reader is equipped with a sensor, template generator and matcher. However, because NIST acceeded to requests from the industry to allow submission of a MATCH-ON-CARD algorithm without an accompanying template generator, we are only able to conduct the following simulation of the PIV assessment process.
We use the current list of ONGOING MINEX qualified template generators to prepare reference templates (notionally for storage on a card), which we then verify against templates from the one MINEX II submitted generator, MX2D, using the MATCH-ON-CARD algorithm under test. This mimics the case in which the supplier of the card were to license and submit Sagem Morpho's template generator to a formal ONGOING MINEX compliance test. The MX2D generator is used because it emits minutia quality values (for BIT use, see section 4.9), is ONGOING MINEX compliant, and because it is was shown in MINEX 04 to yield consistently low error rates in general interoperability situations 16 .
We make the following observations.
From 8(d) shows that the implementation would achieve the same FNMR ≤ 0.01 criterion at FMR = 0.001 but not at FMR = 0.0001.
Three other implmentations, MX2I, MX2J and MX2K come close to attaining PIV compliance. The false non-match rates for some generators exceed the required 0.01 limit.
The most accurate implementation, MX2D, is more accurate at FMR = 0.0001 than the next best matcher at FMR = 0.01 for all but two template generator combinations (Table 8) .
FNMR values are between two and four times higher at FMR = 0.0001 than at 0.01.
As documented previously [7, 6, 8] interoperable error rates are higher when three companies are involved (one for the reference template, another for the verification template, and a third for the matcher provider). This is evident in, for example, Table 8 where the native single-vendor element (MX2D, MX2D) error rate is 0.0015 is the most accurate. This arises because of systematic inconsistencies between implementations on which minutiae are true, false, and missed, and on local placement of minutiae.
The meaning of PIV compliance
For the many reasons noted on page 2, the error rates measured in large scale offline tests using archival data are not specifically representative of any particular application 18 .
However single-image matching evaluations, conducted on massive archival data sets, are extremely valuable for:
fair and repeatable tests, comparative assessments of accuracy, assessing compliance to a dataset-specific performance threshold, and for testing conformance to the standard.
In particular, the offline nature of the ONGOING MINEX and MINEX II tests makes them suitable for assessing the core accuracy and interoperability of minutia matching algorithms. That is, the tests are suitable for exposing implementations that are improperly implementing the underyling INCITS 378 minutia standard.
Thus, while the MINEX trials are necessary for qualification of implementations, and they effectively support operations, they are not sufficient for prediction of fielded performance. 16 In the the Scenario 2 results of the MINEX 04 supplemental http://fingerprint.nist.gov/minex04/minex scenario2.pdf, many matchers exhibited low error rates when templates from the D generator were matched against arbitrary others. Table 9 : Simulated expected transaction time for OR-fused two-finger verification.
For each matcher, there are two rows. The first gives the decision level fusion result for equal thresholds (t 1 = t 2 ) with t 1 set to the lowest value for which FMR(t 1 ) ≤ 0.0005. The second row is the result of a minimum cost search over all possible (t 1 , t 2 ) combinations. The last column gives the expected transaction time in seconds for the time model given in equation 9. The reference and verification templates are from MX2D and B respectively.
One and two finger matching
This report contains performance estimates for one and two-finger authentication. The single-finger results are obtained by pooling the scores from the left and right index finger comparisons as though they were from different individuals. The performance estimates are therefore representative of single-finger verification applications in which users choose to present either left or right index fingers in equal proportion. This report does not assess the effect of multiple verification attempts because it uses archived datasets with only two impressions per finger. Note, however, that the images were collected using the auto-capture paradigm in which a number of images were collected over an interval of a few seconds, and the best one (according to a quality assessment algorithm) retained.
Two mechanisms were used for combining two-finger matching scores: score-level fusion, and decision-level fusion.
Score Fusion:
The fused score is simply the sum of the left and right comparison scores:
where i and j denote the i-th enrolled image and the j-th authentication sample and s is the scalar output of a matcher. This sum-rule is a simple yet powerful method for multi-sample fusion, is ubiquitous in the literature [13, 9] , and has long had theoretical recommendation [10] . The fused score is compared against a threshold, and error rates are again computed using eqs. 4 and 2.
The use of fusion, however, has significant implications. In sum-rule fusion, FNMR rates drop substantially for a given FMR but there is the attendant requirement to always acquire and match samples from both fingers. This will generally double the time, the exception being if two sensors are available and used simultaneously, whence the total time τ T τ T = max(τ 1 , τ 2 )
where we expect the primary and secondary 19 finger times would be expected to be about the same, i.e. τ 1 ≈ τ 2 . 19 We avoid the handedness issue here. In all the analyses we assume each user is righthanded and presents that finger first. This is not truethe natural incidence of right-handedness has been reported as 88% [11] but there are wide geographic and social variations, and a tendency toward righthandness over an individuals lifetime -and is relevant only because left-finger verification gives somewhat larger error rates than right. Table 10 : Use of the second finger.
Accuracy of single-finger, OR-fused (t 1 = t 2 ) and SUM-fused two-finger verification. The threshold is fixed to target a single-finger false match of 0.0005. This is not always achieved (FMR in second column of Table 10 (a)) due to discretized similarity scores. The problem disappears in Table 10 These times would include the user-sensor interaction, capture, minutiae extraction, template generation, communication with smartcard, matching, and return of the result.
If, as is more common, the acquisition is sequential, then the total time, τ T for sum-rule fusion will be
This approach turns out to be accurate but time consuming for users.
Decision ("OR") Fusion:
The more efficient alternative is to only conditionally acquire and compare the second finger. That is, if recognition of a genuine user or impostor is unsuccessful with the first finger, then the second finger is acquired and matched. This constitutes decision-level "OR" fusion. The idea is that many genuine users will require only a single finger to authenticate while the FMR security objective is met after one or two fingers are used. We analyse the time-savings by adopting the model of the 2006 NIST study [14] in which the total transaction time per genuine user will be
where -t 1 and t 2 are the first and second finger matcher thresholds, -τ r is the time taken for the resolution of cases where both fingers fail to match 20 ,
is the fraction of genuine users whose primary fingers are incorrectly rejected, and
is the fraction of genuine users for whom both fingers are rejected.
Note that in the results that follow we assume the single finger attempt time is fixed for all matchers. This blatantly ignores the card timing measurements of 5 which are less than 1 second for all but MX2M. While our intent is to show only the large effects of accuracy variations on time, we recommend that deployers should include these and other times in any formal or predictive model.
Note that this model assumes that the prior probability of impostors is small enough that their contribution to the aggregate transaction time is negligible.
We conduct two analyses, one in which t 1 = t 2 , and a second in which the thresholds differ and are optimized to offer greater efficiency while maintaining an FMR objective. The determination of thresholds proceeds empirically:
20 For example, authentication by a supervisor or via an alternative biometric modality.
We use a global 21 search to find the (t 1 , t 2 ) pair that minimizes the "cost" function τ T while satisfying the overall security constraint FMR T ≤ 0.001, say.
Fusion results
We arbitrarily set τ 1 = 4 seconds (i.e. the time for acquisition plus MATCH-ON-CARD processing of the first finger), τ 2 = 6s (i.e. the times for a prompt, switch, acquisition plus processing of the second finger), and τ r = 90s (remedial authentication). NIST advances this model and set of parameters only as an example -any given operation should tailor such analysis specifically -and besides the actual τ values are irrelevant upto a multiplier. The result is a verification time that in many cases is exactly four seconds, but for some extends to 10 or 100 seconds.
For an overall FMR target of 0.001, we execute the model of eq. 9 for cases where t 1 = t 2 =FMR −1 (0.0005) and where t 1 = t 2 are solved for to minimize cost. Table 9 shows the results from which the following observations can be made.
Row one, column five shows that, for the most accurate matcher, the fraction of users needing to present a second finger is 3.06% when the thresholds are set to be equal.
Row two, column five shows that, for the most accurate matcher, this fraction drops to 2.86% when the thresholds are allowed to float. The efficiency saving is larger for other implementations. This is achieved by lowering t 1 and elevating t 2 . An added benefit is that the achieved overall FMR in column 6 is closer to the target FMR than for equal thresholds. Table 10 summarizes the situation in which t 1 = t 2 = t are set to achieve a target FMR of 0.0005 and users authenticate with their primary finger and only present their secondary finger if the first was rejected. Referring to Table 10(b), the results are:
The FMR values are almost exactly doubled by allowing a second attempt;
The FNMR values are reduced by factors between five and eleven; Together these differences are in agreement with the single-finger vs. sum-fused DET plots of Figure 1 ;
The cells shaded green indicate that PIV compliance is possible with decision level fusion (at least for this particular matcher and template generator combination);
The operational relevance of decision-level fusion is an improvement in efficiency: Not all users will have to present a secondary finger. In the case of MX2D cards and the particular template generator combination, only 3.86% of genuine users will have to submit their secondary finger.
Score level fusion is slightly more accurate than decision level fusion.
None of the comparisons involved impostors presenting left as right, or vice versa.
Effect of discrete similarity scores
The effect of tied scores, as demonstrated in the latter rows of Table 10 (a), is the failure to achieve the target FMR value of 0.0005. One remedy is to break ties by adding small amounts of noise to all scores:
21 A global search for MX2D and MX2E was not possible because the large number of unique scores makes the naïve computation too costly. Instead we conducted a local search over a threshold range of t 0 ± 4000 in increments of 5 about the point t 0 =FMR −1 (0.0005). This entails 400 2 function evaluations. Table 11 : Effect of enhanced methods for minutiae removal.
The tables show the effect on FMR and FNMR of using minutia quality values and dedicated centers for removal of minutiae to satisfy MOC algorithm capability constraints. Throughout, the threshold is fixed at the (matcher-specific) value of 7 to give FMR near 0.001. The B generator does not emit quality values (per MINEX 04 requirements), and so its outputs are always pruned radially. In Table 10 (a) the dedicated pruning center is used. In Table 10 (b) the minutia quality values are zero throughout.
where U is a uniformly distributed noise process of zero mean and width d/50. The value of d is
i.e. the smallest difference between any two matcher scores.
The effect of using equation 10 is to allow precise realization of the (higher) target FMR value, and to thereby reduce FNMR. This is evident by comparing values in columns four and five of Table 10 (a) with the corresponding elements in Table 10 (b).
Effect of using minutia quality values
The original MINEX 04 test required the minutia quality byte of the INCITS 378 record to be set to zero. This was done because it was considered that vendor values would be non-interoperable. In MINEX II , this requirement was dropped to allow quality values to be used to direct removal of minutiae. This process is part of the INCITS 378 to ISO/IEC 19794-2 COMPACT CARD conversion and is needed to strip excess minutiae from larger templates to satisfy the limits communicated by the card in its ISO/IEC 7816 BIT. The BIT parameters are listed in Table 12 .
The evaluation plan [8] augmented the INCITS 378 definition of minutia quality to state that quality should be related to likelihood of the minutia being a true minutia (as opposed to a local ridge clarity measure, for example). In all cases, when a vendor's card had both BITs, they were identical.
Without quality values, the simplest mechanism for satisfying card cabability limits is to remove those with the largest radial distance from the center, as alluded to in ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 .
This procedure was described in the evaluation plan [8] . To test the effectiveness of quality-directed pruning we applied only one of the 60-minutiae MATCH-ON-CARD implementations, MX2I. We generated a set of templates using the quality enabled MX2D minutia detector. We matched those against both MX2D templates and no-quality-value B templates. We then stripped the quality values from the MX2D templates, and rematched.
From the results shown in Table 10 (a) the following observations can be made:
The FNMR values are higher, and the FMR values are lower, when either or both of the input templates contain more than 60 minutiae i.e. max(N r , N v ) > 60. These effects are larger for very large templates i.e. max(N r , N v ) > 70.
The quality-then-radial approach is superior to the radial-only method (i.e. eq. 12) only when both templates have minutia quality values (i.e. the MX2D-MX2D rows in the bottom half of the Table 10 (a)). Refering to the last two lines, the effect is to reduce FNMR (0.0992 → 0.0769).
When one template is generated with quality values (MX2D) but the other does not (B) there is no gain in accuracy.
Refering to the second block of three rows the effect on FNMR (0.1817 → 0.1816) is negligible:
Effect of using dedicated centers for pruning
The MINEX II API [8] allowed the template generator to return the coordinates of a point about which minutiae should be removed. This was suggested by industry as an improvement over the use of the center-of-mass.
To assess whether this dedicated center was worthwhile, we again applied matcher MX2I to MX2D and B templates. The quality values were set to zero in all MX2D templates. Equation 12 was applied using either the specific (x c , y c ) or the center of mass
The results are shown in Table 10 (b). We make the following observations.
As with quality assisted pruning, there is essentially no change in accuracy when MX2D templates are compared with B templates.
For MX2D-MX2D comparisons, there is a decrease in accuracy when templates are pruned about the dedicated center. Note that the minutia quality values were set to zero because otherwise minutia would be removed on the basis of low quality first and then on distance.
The conclusions on minutia removal this and the preceding section weakened by the following.
Only one quality-equipped generator was available (MX2D) and it was used with only one other generator (B) and one matcher (MX2I).
The negative result for the MX2D-B combination may be different for other template generators if they tend to produce more or fewer minutiae. This requires further testing.
The comparison of templates from the same vendor may be rare in a large federated multivendor interoperable MATCH-ON-CARD application.
The results should not be considered as general until a wider survey of quality-enabled and center-enabled template generators can be conducted.
Card errors
All cards operated perfectly except that the MX2M card objected to the reference template PUT DATA command on 11 out of 80000 occasions. The error code in each case was 0x6F00.
Card-SDK differences
With two exceptions, all SDK and corresponding card-based matching implementations produced identical similarity scores given the same input template pairs. This was measured over 80000 comparisons. Identity of scores is the critical assurance that the on-card and off-card algorithms are identical.
The two exceptions were:
MX2G which gave non-identical scores on 49 of 80000 comparisons. These all occured on low-scoring impostor comparisons, and the absolute score difference never exceeded 3. This means that about 0.06% of impostor and approximately 0.02% of genuine comparisons gave different SDK and Card values.
Whenever the MX2M sdk produced a similarity score of 7 or below, the MX2M card reported 0. This means that about 84% of impostor and approximately 5% of genuine comparisons gave different SDK and Card values. The consequence of this disparity is that NIST cannot conclude that the same algorithm is in use, and would not test it for compliance to the PIV accuracy specification.
MOC timing
Measurement techniques
For each card submitted, NIST measured the duration of all executions of the following actions.
Reference template storage operations made using the PUT DATA APDU, Template comparisons using the VERIFY APDU which includes the sending of the verification template to the card, and
The similarity score retrieval operations made via the GET DATA APDU.
The time taken to generate the verification template is not included in the above. For the MX2D generator, the median time to convert an in-memory uncompressed greyscale raster image into an INCITS 378 record was 0.11 seconds. The 99-th percentile time was 0.19 seconds. These times apply to Xeon-based PCs. These times were measured by means of the Linux gettimeofday() system call. The NIST card test driver wraps each APDU in two such calls, and the interval is obtained by subtraction. This is shown in the driver source code, which may be downloaded and inspected via the NIST open-source server (see BIOMAPP, section 3.7).
While the gettimeofday() call offers better than microsecond resolution on the platform we used for testing, the measured durations include more than just the elemental card operations. The overhead includes these all the calls to the PC/SC library, communication from the card driver process to the PC/SC smartcard daemon, and USB communication.
The effect of these is assumed to be fixed across all MATCH-ON-CARD implementations tested. In particular, the host computer was dedicated to the testing of the cards, with only normal operating system related and file system processes running. These processes require very little overhead in terms of overall system resources.
The hardware listed in Appendix A was disclosed to participants before the test. MINEX II did not test other configurations, and while we understand that faster end-to-end times may be possible using alternative hardware and protocols, the timing method used here is fair and consistent for comparison of implementations. MX2E, the less accurate sibling of MX2D, is not appreciably faster. However, the variance and worst-case times are reduced.
Comparison timing results
For the fastest implementation, MX2G, the median time for the execution of genuine VERIFY command is 0.18 seconds.
Across all matchers, the median VERIFY time never exceeds 0.8 seconds.
The VERIFY time distributions are approximately Normal (Q-Q plots are linear to beyond +3σ). However, outliers do occur and these are not measurement errors attributable to the testing platform. Instead there are a small number of templates that are problematic for multiple suppliers' matchers. For example, one template involved in the second-slowest MX2D comparison (2.45 seconds) also causes comparisons in excess of two seconds for matchers MX2I, MX2J and MX2K.
In all cases, the variance of the genuine comparisons is larger than that of impostor comparisons.
Other timing results
We also measured the times required to place a reference template on the card and to retrieve the similarity score from the card. These are summarized as boxplots in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) . Both of these are unimportant: population of the card happens once at time of card issuance, and retrieval is a test-specific function, and never part of an operational authentication attempt. The retrieval time is interesting here because it reveals the variation inherent in the card-PC communication for the retrieval of a fixed size data object (8 bytes) . Over all matchers, 2σ = 0.007 seconds. The CBEFF info, tags 0x87 and 0x88 within the BHT are actually missing because we believed it was the default value as described in Note 6 of Table C1 of 7816-11.
However, Note 6 in Table C1 of the MINEX II Evaluation Plan [8] refers to the OID of the CBEFF standard body field (tag 0x06) only, not the format owner and format type fields, which are noted as mandatory. This fact was pointed out to the vendor, and we received this response:
You are correct and the note 6 of table C1 applies only to the 0x06 tag in the BIT, not the 0x87 and 0x88 tags in the BHT. Our reading assumed that the logic behind note 6 could also applied to the 0x87 and 0x88 tags in the BHT and that the editor forgot to extend the note 6 to these 2 tags of similar nature. But we can easily add these 2 tags in the next card delivery.
This was done. In order to proceed with testing, we modified the NIST test driver to ignore the absence of these fields. Future testing within the MINEX II framework will require the presence of these fields.
Card and Matcher IDs in the TLV objects:
The MINEX II test specification defined the APDUs and expected responses for reading card and matcher IDs. The GET DATA instruction code (0xCB) is used, and the Lc field contains a tag list data object (code 0x5C), requesting a single TLV data item to be returned. The requested object ID for the card ID is 0x66, and for the matcher ID is 0x6E.
The MINEX II Evaluation Plan [8] states that the returned data object should be of the form "0x73 06 88 04 <4 byte CBEFF ID>", which is non-conforming with regard to ISO 7816 use of the 0x5C code, in that the returned data object's tag should be the same as that requested. Therefore, the correct response for the card ID is "0x66 08 73 06 88 04 <4 byte card ID>", and for the matcher ID is "0x6E 08 73 06 99 04 <4 byte matcher ID>".
One vendor returned the data object in the correct (i.e. NOT according to the MINEX II document) form; all other cards returned the IDs in the form given in the document. NIST changed the test software to accept either form so testing could proceed. Future versions of the MINEX II will be corrected, and cards should return data objects in the ISO-compliant format.
An improvement to the test specification is to use a single APDU to request both the card and matcher IDs to be returned in the application related data object: The APDU would be the same as currently used for matcher ID: "0x00 CB 3F FF 03 5C 01 6E 00"
The response data object would be: "0x6E 0E 73 0C 88 04 <4 byte card ID> 99 04 <4 byte matcher ID>"
Another alternative is to ask for both card and matcher IDs to be returned in a single response. The APDU would be: "0x00 CB 3f FF 04 5C 02 66 6E" with this response: "0x66 08 73 06 88 04 <4 byte card ID> 6E 08 73 06 99 04 <4 byte matcher ID>" MX2D = Sagem Morpho MX2E = Sagem Morpho MX2G = Oberthur / id3 MX2H = Oberthur / id3 MX2I = Oberthur / id3 MX2J = Oberthur / id3 MX2K = Oberthur / id3 MX2M = Giesecke -Devrient
